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This paper explores the likely efficacy of government agencies using their contracting relationships with
private firms to affect training outcomes in the construction industry. Specifically, it reports on the
results of a study of two training policies of the Western Australian government. Empirical data is drawn
from the government’s Tender Registration System between 1997 and 2006. The main finding of the
quantitative analysis is that in the absence of strong industry commitment to policy objectives, the
contracting approach is likely to result in high levels of avoidance activity and generate very few
benefits. The results of a qualitative investigation also support these findings.
& 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The basic principles of welfare economics require that the sum
of the social costs of a policy intervention be justified by its
contribution of social benefits. This paper explores the costs and
benefits of a specific policy intervention: the leveraging of training
outcomes on public construction projects. This intervention,
which basically mandates minimum investments on training by
contractors engaged in public works, is typically motivated by a
desire to achieve the social and economic benefits associated with
an increased supply of skilled construction labour. However, one
of the potential costs of the intervention is a reduction in the
amount of competition for these projects, with obvious con-
sequences for average bid prices and choice. In jurisdictions, such
as Western Australia, where construction market conditions have
recently been characterised by a shortfall of tenderers and rising
costs, this potential competitive effect is of particular concern.
Further costs that may be involved with the inclusion of training
objectives in construction contracts include costs of policy
development, the administration and monitoring of contract
performance, and, for contractors, costs associated with compli-
ance and reporting.
This paper reports on the results of a case study of the effects
of two training policies of the Western Australian government: the
Priority Access Policy and the Building Skills Policy. Each of these
policies aimed at ensuring an adequate supply of skilled labour in
the construction industry.2 The Priority Access Policy, first
implemented in August 1999, required contractors to meet a
range of minimum training requirements3 before being eligible to
tender on public building and construction contracts. The Building
Skills Policy, which was first implemented in October 2002,
specified that 10% of deemed labour hours be allocated to the
employment of apprentices and/or trainees. On January 1, 2007,
both policies were integrated into the Priority Start—Building
Policy.
The quantitative parts of the study (summarised in Section 3)
addressed a specific and important research question about the
costs associated with these policies: did they have a detrimental
impact on level of bid activity for public construction projects?
This part of the enquiry was based on a unique set of data from
the Western Australian Department of Housing and Work’s Tender
Registration System between 1997 and 2006. This enabled the
identification of possible adverse competitive effects of the two
policies in the Western Australian public construction sector.
The qualitative parts of the study (summarised in Section 4)
addressed more widely-defined research questions about the
range and magnitude of the costs and benefits associated with the
policies. A wide range of contractors were interviewed in this part
of the study. They provided detailed information on the costs
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imposed on them as a result of the training provisions, as well as
information on the effect of the policies on their training
decisions. Policy officers in the key government agencies respon-
sible for either sponsoring the policies or ensuring their
implementation were also interviewed. This contributed impor-
tant information on the rationale for the different policies and
experiences with policy implementation.
The design of both the quantitative and qualitative parts of this
study was informed by previous studies of the contracting out of
government activities. As is outlined in Section 2, the number of
empirical studies of the costs and benefits of policies that leverage
training outcomes on public construction projects is very small.
However, theoretical work within the tradition of principal-agent
analysis and transaction cost theory, together with empirical work
on the contracting out of a range of government services, was
available to guide this study.
2. Literature
A number of theoretical and empirical studies have analysed
the costs and benefits associated with the contracting out of
government activities. As Jensen and Stonecash (2004) explain in
their own literature review on this issue, most previous empirical
studies of contracting out have attempted to measure the cost
savings achieved through privatisation, as this was the focus of
policy debate in the 1980s and 1990s. Relatively few studies have
addressed the ability of contracting arrangements to ensure the
delivery of desired ‘quality’ outcomes,4 or the costs of achieving
these outcomes via contracting arrangements.
2.1. Theoretical studies
As could be expected, the theoretical literature on the
leveraging of training outcomes on public construction projects
is very limited. However, a number of studies have developed
frameworks and engaged in analyses that have some application
to the issues under consideration. In the economics literature
these papers are generally associated with applications of
microeconomic concepts, especially those relating to what is known
as contract theory or principal-agent analysis (see especially Alchian
and Demsetz, 1972; Prendergast, 1999; Sappington, 1991).
Principal-agent analysis is an economic framework that can be
applied to the contractual relationship between a public-sector
works agency and their ‘agents’ (e.g. a construction company). As
is typical of most microeconomic theory, this framework begins
by setting out the objective functions of the two sets of players.
For example, the public works agency is assumed to aim for the
maximum possible net social benefit from its projects, whilst the
construction company is assumed to aim for maximum profits.
Principal-agent analysis then directs attention to the circum-
stances, which can cause contracts to be ‘incomplete’ in that they
are unable to fully specify desired outcomes. As is elaborated on in
the papers surveyed below, these problems can cause additional
monitoring and transaction costs and encourage strategic, anti-
competitive behaviour. This can cause the contracts to fail to
realise the maximum possible net social benefit.
A particularly important aspect of this type of analysis relates
to the difficulties encountered in designing a contract that fully
specifies all the required quantity and quality outcomes, and,
generally, result in a failure to realise potential social benefits.
Hart et al. (1997) develop a model, (hereafter the HSV model),
which they use to explore the factors affecting the ability of a
government agency to secure social benefits from the contracting
out of a government service. The model relates to circumstances
where contracts are incomplete and the government agency is
interested in achieving the ‘basic’ contract outcomes (such as a
desired public facility), as well as ‘quality improvements’ (such as
training opportunities for local youth). These improvements are
described as creating direct and effort costs for the contractor but
social gains for the community at large. Thus, including improve-
ments in the contract is likely to be associated with a higher price
(see also Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
Hart et al. (1997) model the factors affecting the negotiation of
a price for quality improvements in public contracts. These factors
include those relating to: (a) the relationship between a
contractor’s investment in the quality improvement and social
outcomes (this will affect the willingness of the government to
offer a higher price); (b) the relationship between the quality
improvement and the contractor’s costs of production (this will
affect the contractor’s willingness to supply the improvement);
and (c) competition in the tender market (for example, ‘tight’
markets will tend to bid up the price of quality innovations).
A development of the HSV model by Bennett and Iossa (2005)
identifies how issues relating to asset ownership may also affect
the ability to secure quality improvements in a construction
contract. They demonstrate that if a contractor expects to capture
(or internalise) some of the benefits of a quality improvement
then the residual value of the contract accruing to the firm will
increase with the quality improvement. This increases the like-
lihood that the firm will make investments in quality and reduce
problems associated with regulating these improvements.
A large literature on the economics of training (see especially
Becker, 1975)5 helps to elaborate on these particular relationships.
In the case of training, the basic HSV model applies to those
circumstances where the skills provided via the quality improve-
ment are perfectly transferable (or ‘general’). This leaves the
contractor with little incentive to invest in training as the mobility
of trained workers will limit the contractor’s opportunity to
recoup any of the training costs it incurs.
The Bennett and Iossa extension focuses attention on the
alternative situation, where the skills produced by a training
programme have at least some degree of specificity and/or the
skills involved are general but the labour market is imperfectly
competitive. In these cases, due to restrictions on the mobility of
trained workers, the firm is able to capture (or internalise) at least
some of the benefits of a training investment. This will increase
the contractor’s willingness to supply the training improvement
as part of a construction contract, and reduce the need for
regulation of this outcome.
Globerman and Vining (1996) take a different and less
theoretical approach to the analysis of the contracting out of
services. However, their paper provides a useful complementary
framework to the HSV model, especially with regards the analysis
of the impact of governance costs on the efficiency and
organisation of contracts.
Central to Globerman and Vining framework are issues
associated with task complexity (the degree of difficulty in
specifying and monitoring the terms and conditions of a
transaction) and contestability (the degree of potential competi-
tion in the market for the contracted good or service). If task
involved in specifying and monitoring training outcomes, for
example, is large and outside the sphere of a government agency’s
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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5 An overview of this theory is available in most standard labour economics
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sphere of expertise, it may be unable to effectively design and
negotiate desired contract outcomes. Jensen and Stonecash (2004)
note additionally that the presence of uncertainty about desired
outcomes is likely to result in higher tendered prices and/or an
unwillingness to tender for projects.
In Globerman and Vining’s (1996), contestability as a deterrent
to opportunistic behaviour by contractors. It also creates an
incentive for contractors to submit tender bids close to their
marginal costs of production, reducing the agency’s bargaining
task in relation to desired quality outcomes. Rimmer (1994)
concurs with this analysis, arguing that the contestability in the
market should be one of the key factors considered before a
project is outsourced (see also Reca and Zieg, 1995).
2.2. Empirical studies
There have been few empirical studies of the types of issues
raised in this paper and, of those that have been conducted, there
is only a limited ability to generalise their results. In the following
paragraphs we summarise the literature relating to studies of the
experiences of contracting government services.
Jensen and Stonecash (2004) provide a very useful overview of
empirical studies of outsourcing. They describe how empirical
analysis of outsourcing has mainly focused on cleaning and refuse
collection (e.g. Edwards and Stevens, 1978) as, apparently, they are
the most frequently outsourced government services, and also
because the outputs from both of these services are fairly easy to
measure. Other empirical studies have been conducted on indus-
tries associated with transportation services, the maintenance of
heavy equipment, waste water treatment (e.g. Holcombe, 1991), fire
protection services, prison management services, tax assessment
services (e.g. Carver, 1989), and road and maintenance services (e.g.
Blom-Hansen, 2003). Most (but not all) of these analyses provided
evidence of reductions in expenditure following outsourcing.
Other empirical evidence reviewed by Jensen and Stonecash
indicates that very few outsourcing projects turn out as expected.
Supporting the proposition advanced in Section 2.1, this research
apparently identified problems associated with incomplete con-
tracts, ex ante cost uncertainties, the specification and measure-
ment of output, and the inherent risk associated with all projects.
The authors assert that contract design is one of the important
factors in determining the success of outsourcing the provision of
a government service.
The methodology generally used to determine the magnitude
of any cost savings from the outsourcing of a government service
involves a comparison of the cost of the public provision of a
government service with that of the private provision. Most of the
studies cited above as examples employed regression techniques
to establish these comparisons. However, Jensen and Stonecash
note that a number of difficulties are typically encountered in
effectively implementing these methods. First, public-sector data
on operating costs and outputs is typically lacking. Second, it is
difficult to find comparable services provided in public and private
sector environments. Third, the dynamic nature of most contrac-
tual relationships reduces the value of cross-sectional data.
Other work by Jensen (notably, Domberger and Jensen, 1997)
provides a useful example of a case-study approach to the
identification of the costs and benefits of outsourcing, especially
with regards ensuring ‘quality’ outcomes. These authors examine
outcomes from the outsourcing of refuse collection services and
note that in this particular case effort can be either devoted to
producing the refuse collection service or maintaining the refuse
collection vehicles They found that in the cases where the
government owns the refuse collection vehicles and leases them
to the private provider, the private provider would have little
incentive to maintain the vehicles to a standard that would ensure
their economic life extended passed the length of the contract.
Thus, to overcome this problem, where refuse collection services
are contracted out, it is generally specified that the private
provider should own the vehicles. They concluded that poor
specification and lack of monitoring appeared to be the main
causes of quality-shading investments (such as the failure to
maintain vehicles) and that improved contract design and
implementation could prevent quality-shading investments.
In summary, this literature review has identified a number of
valuable theoretical and empirical perspectives on the issues
associated with the current paper. Existing theoretical models
help to define the key categories of factors that are likely to be
relevant to the costs and benefits of leveraged training outcomes.
These include: the relationship between training and the
contractor’s costs of production; competition/contestability in
the tender market; the nature of the training involved with the
project (general or specific); uncertainty about future product
market conditions; and the complexity of the training task. The
relationship between the various government agencies involved
in the development and administration of training policies is also
highlighted as a possible determinant of costs and benefits.
The empirical studies reviewed in this section generally
provide limited guidance on the research questions of this project.
Most previous empirical work has focused on the extent of
potential cost savings from privatisation. Few studies have
explored the impacts on quality of outsourcing and/or the efficacy
of alternative contractual methods. This highlights the novelty of
the material presented in the remaining parts of this paper.
3. Quantitative analysis
The unique data captured by the Western Australian Depart-
ment of Housing and Work’s Tender Registration System enables a
quantitative analysis of one potentially important costs of policies,
which leverage training outcomes on public construction projects:
a reduction in competition for these projects. The theoretical
papers reviewed in the preceding section identify that this impact
will arise if contractors perceive that mandated training require-
ments add to their production costs and, thus, reduce the
profitability of any tender bid. The empirical literature also
reviewed in Section 2.2 suggests that this type of effect has not
been measured in Australia before. This indicates that the data
that now exists on tender bids and outcomes in most Australian
jurisdictions has yet to be utilised by researchers.
3.1. Data and methods
The Tender Registration System (TRS) was implemented in
1996 as a way of recording the tender details of all WA government
construction projects. The TRS database contains records on the
details of each project: a description of the works to be
undertaken; the location of the planned work; and the estimated
pre-tender value of the project. The database also contains
information on the number of tender documents requested for
each project, together with details on each of the tenders received
and the winning bid. As such, the TRS is a unique and
comprehensive resource for examining changes and variations in
bid activity in an important segment of the construction ‘market’.
In the study use was made of the TRS project and tender details
on 2519 government non-residential construction contracts
awarded between 19976 and 2006. For these contracts 11,525
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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tender bids were submitted. This represents close to all the
contracts and bids included in the TRS over the 10-year period.
Only a very small number of contracts were excluded from the
analysis due to incomplete recording of their details.7
As outlined in Section 1, the central research question
addressed in the quantitative part of this study is whether the
additional training requirements imposed as a result of the
Priority Access and Building Skills policies had a measurable and
distinct impact on bid activity for public construction contracts.
That is, was there a measurable effect of these policies on bid
numbers that was separate from the impacts on bid activity
generated by changing economic conditions in the state?
Conducting such an analysis clearly requires a multi-factor
approach that is able to ‘control’ for the influence of the range of
other factors on bid numbers (such as changes in private
construction activity and costs, as well as variations in contract
region and project size) before focusing on the relationship
between the implementation of the policies and bid activity.
The approach adopted for this investigation was to examine
variations in the number of tender bids for non-residential
government construction contracts around the time of the
implementation of each policy.8 In the case of Priority Access
policy, the analysis period was August 1997–2001, which
encompasses the 24 months prior to and the 24 months after
the implementation date of the policy. In the case of the Building
Skills policy, the 48-month analysis period was October
2000–2004.
Analysis focused on differences in bid activity between the
‘market’ segments affected and unaffected by the policy. In the
case of the Priority Access Policy this involved a comparison of
changes in bid activity across the analysis period between (a)
projects with a pre-tender value of at least $150,0009 (and thus
potentially affected by the policy); and (b) projects with a pre-
tender value of less than $150,000 (not affected by the policy). In
the case of the Building Skills Policy the two comparison groups
were (a) projects with a pre-tender value of more than
$2million10; and (b) projects with a pre-tender value of $2 million
or less. In each case we hypothesised that if the policies were
affecting bid activity, activity levels would have fallen in relative
terms in the market segment affected by the policy. Furthermore,
this fall would be observed in the analysis period.
To identify the effect of each policy’s introduction on bid
activity ordinary least-squares regression techniques were used to
estimate the following equation, which relates to the determina-
tion of the number of bids for public construction contracts.
NBi ¼ b1 þ b2PDi þ b3Zi þ b4PTi þ b5RNi
þ b6OFi þ g1ðZi  PDiÞ þ i (1)
NBi, is the number of bids submitted on contract i; PDi is a
dummy variable that is based on the date of implementation of
the policy (for example, in the case of Priority Access this variable
takes on a value of 1 for all contracts dated after August 1999); Zi
is a dummy variable that identifies whether the contract falls
within the scope of the policy’s application (in the case of Priority
Access this variable is coded as ‘1’ for all contracts with a value of
$150,000 or more); PTi is a continuous measure that relates to the
contract’s pre-tender value; RNi is a dummy variable that
identifies whether the location of the project was in the Perth,
South-West or Peel Regions, or in another, more remote region. OFi
is a continuous variable based on the value of the Building Cost
index in the month that the bids were recorded. It is used in this
model to proxy the level of competition in the construction
market.11 Finally, the interaction term (Zi PDi) identifies those
projects that were affected by the implementation of the policy
(for example, in the case of Priority Access this variable will only
take on a value of 1 for contracts with a pre-tender value of
$150,000 or more and dated after August 1999). b1 is a constant;
whilst b2–6 are measures of the relationship between change in
the value of the dependent variables and the number of bids. g1
measures the relationship between change in the interaction term
and the number of bids. ei is a random error term, which is
assumed to be normally distributed with E(ei) ¼ 0 and the
var(ei) ¼ s2.
The modelled relationship can be described diagrammatically
in very simplified terms. The function S, shown in the Fig. 1,
describes, for simplicity’s sake, a positive, linear relationship
between the pre-tender value of a public construction contract
(PTi) and the number of bids (NBi).
The other factors in the model are hypothesised to be
associated with shifts in this function. For example, in more
remote regions the function S could be expected to shift down-
wards (implying a positive coefficient on the variable RNi in
Eq. (1)) due to the greater difficulties in accomplishing construc-
tion work in these areas as compared to less remote regions.
Higher building costs (OFi) are likely to be associated with a
downward/rightward shift in the function (implying a negative
value on the coefficient b6). Note that the function S will intersect
the horizontal axis when the project value is so low that it attracts
no bids.
If the introduction of a training policy has a negative effect on
bid activity, its application only to projects with a PTiXZi would
cause a discontinuity in S around point Zi (as represented by the
function S0). Note that the vertical line in the figure aligns with Zi
and thus it represents the threshold value of contracts affected by
the policy. Evidence in support of the hypothesis that the training
policy had an effect on bid activity would be a significant negative
value on the coefficient g1.
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7 The omission of records on location and tender value appeared to be due to
record keeping errors and is, thus, unlikely to be a source of systematic bias in the
results of our analysis.
8 This approach to restricting the time period allows us to focus more fully on
the effects of the policy whilst allowing for the possibility of anticipatory or
delayed effects.
9 The Priority Skills Policy only applied to projects with a value above
$150,000.
10 The Building Skills Policy only applied to projects with a value above
$2 million.
11 As noted in Section 2, this index reflects current costs of accomplishing the
types of construction projects contracted for via the TRS. A variety of measures of
market conditions (such as indexes of labour availability, materials costs, etc.) are
available. However, testing indicated that these are strongly correlated with the
Building Cost Index.
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The other variables in Eq. (1) serve as controls for this analysis.
The individual term PDi controls for the possibility (seemingly
remote) that there was a change in bid activity for all contracts
around the time of the introduction of the policy. The individual
term Zi controls for the possibility (more likely) that there are
underlying differences in the relationship between tender activity
and pre-tender prices in the group of contracts ‘priced’ above and
below the trigger value of the policy.
3.2. Results of quantitative analysis
The estimated relationships between tender bid numbers and
the various explanatory variables included in the RHS of Eq. (1)
using the TRS data are outlined in this section. Reflecting the
above discussion, these results are presented separately for the
Priority Access and Building Skills policies.
3.2.1. Priority Access Policy
Eq. (1) was first estimated with reference to data on bid
numbers on public construction contracts for the period August
1997–2001. In this case Zi is defined by the introduction of the
Priority Access Policy in August 1999 and PDi is defined by the
policy’s application to projects with a value of $150,000 or more.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1 below.
The data in Table 1 indicate that the implementation of the
Priority Access Policy in August 1999 did not have a significant
effect on competition for government non-residential construc-
tion contracts in WA. The reduction in bid numbers observed
around the time of the implementation of this policy was similar
in ‘market segments’ subject to the influence of the policy
(i.e. contracts with a value of $150,000 or more) and in other
parts of the ‘market’. The figures in Table 1 show, rather, that
during the analysis period (August 1997–2001) bid numbers
varied between contracts firstly due to regional factors. The
average number of bids on contracts in more remote regions was
1.42 bids less than the number of bids on contracts in the Perth,
South-West and Peel group of regions. Bid numbers in the analysis
period were also significantly affected by the value of the contract.
Contracts with a value of $150,000 or more had, on average, close
to 1 additional bid per contract than those with a lower pre-
tender value. A somewhat surprising result is the lack of a
statistical significant relationship between the Building Cost index
and bid numbers. The most likely explanation for this is that the
period 1997–2001 was a period of relatively stable economic
conditions. There was little variation in the Building Cost index
over the analysis period and, thus, this was not an important
source of differences in bid activity.
3.2.2. Building Skills Policy
The results derived from the application of Eq. (1) to TRS data
relevant to the Building Skills Policy are presented in Table 2. In
this case the analysis period spans October 2000–2004; Zi is
defined by the introduction of the Building Skills Policy in October
2002; and PDi is defined by the policy’s application to projects
with a value above $2 million. The results of this analysis are
presented in Table 2 below.
The data in Table 2 provide some evidence of a negative impact
of the Building Skills Policy on bid activity relating to government
non-residential construction contracts in WA. Bid numbers on
contracts affected by the policy (i.e. above $2 million in value and
commencing after October 2002) were, on average, 1.42 bids
lower than contracts not affected by the policy after 2002.
However, this effect was only statistically significant at the 10%
level.
A further contrast between the results in Table 2 and those in
Table 1 is the significance of building costs as a source of variation
in bid numbers. The figures in Table 2 indicate a strong negative
relationship between the Building Cost index and bid numbers.
The difference between the results in Tables 1 and 2 is likely to
derive from the relatively large rate of change in the Building Cost
index between 2000 and 2004, as compared to 1997–2001.
A similarity between the two sets of results is the measured
importance of regional factors as a source of variation in bid
numbers. In Table 2 the average number of bids on contracts in
more remote regions was 1.27 bids less than the number of bids
on contracts in the Perth, South-West and Peel region. Finally, bid
numbers in the analysis period relevant to the Building Skills
Policy were positively affected by the value of the contract.
3.2.3. Differences across market segments
The effects of the Building Skills Policy in the key segments of the
WA public construction ‘market’ can be explored further by adding
further terms to Eq. (1). These terms interact the policy implemen-
tation date variable with measures of the pre-qualification level of
the contractor.12 The coefficients on these terms identify the
different effects of the Building Skills Policy in market segments
associated with the pre-qualification status of the contractors, which
is closely related to firm size. The amended regression results are
outlined in Table 3.
It can be noted, first, that the inclusion of the new terms did
not cause the estimated role of other key variables—such as
region and building costs—to change in any substantial way. The
changed formulation of the model indicates that pre-qualification
level is, in the main, an insignificant source of variation in bid
numbers. However, the coefficients on the interaction terms are
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 1
Estimated coefficients for equation on bid numbers on government non-residential
construction contracts (Priority Access Policy), Western Australia 1997–2001.
Variable Coefficient Prob.
Constant 4.2950 0.6142
Policy implementation date (PD) 0.4990 0.3528
Contract above trigger value (Z) 0.9299 0.0007
Pre-tender value (PT) 1.29E07 0.0033
Region 1.4243 0.0000
Building cost index 0.0720 0.3394
PD Z 0.0216 0.9612
Notes: Log-likelihood: 1957.8; nobs: 789; method: OLS.
Table 2
Estimated coefficients for equation on bid numbers on government non-residential
construction contracts (Building Skills Policy), Western Australia 2000–2004.
Variable Coefficient Prob.
Constant 9.3524 0.0000
Policy implementation date (PD) 0.4719 0.0516
Contract above trigger value (Z) 1.4512 0.1009
Pre-tender value (PT) 1.39E07 0.0008
Region 1.2794 0.0000
Building cost index 0.0436 0.0004
PD Z 1.4152 0.0986
Notes: Log-likelihood: 1873.5; nobs: 807; method: OLS.
12 Pre-qualification level identifies the eligibility of contractors to tender for
projects of different values and is closely linked to the size of the company. Pre-
qualification for level 3 requires a demonstrated capacity to tender for projects
between $1.5 and $3m; level 4 is limited to companies with a capacity to complete
work between $3 and $7.5m; whilst level 5 is restricted to companies with an
assessed capacity to take onwork over $7.5m. Pre-qualification is closely related to
tender value. Thus, the tender value variable is removed from the amended
regression equation.
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the main focus of our interest in this section. They identify
whether—and to what extent—the measured effect of the
introduction of the Building Skills Policy on bid numbers varied
significantly between the different pre-qualification levels. For
example, the coefficient on the last interaction term measures the
extent to which the difference in bid numbers associated with the
policy’s introduction varied between the group of projects
associated with what is known as a pre-qualification level 5
(restricted to the largest construction firms) and those projects
with a pre-qualification level of 2 or less. The results on the
interaction terms indicate, first, that the changes in bid numbers
on projects associated with pre-qualification levels 4 and 5
following the introduction of the Building Skills Policy were not
significantly different from the change recorded by projects
unaffected by the policy. This implies that large firms were
relatively unaffected by the policy’s introduction. In contrast, bid
numbers on projects associated with pre-qualification level
following the policy’s introduction, are shown to be significantly
lower than bid numbers on projects unaffected by the policy. This
implies that small to medium-sized firms were affected by the
policy’s introduction, and that they reduced their willingness to
tender on government projects as a result. The results are
summarised in Fig. 2.
3.3. Discussion of quantitative results
The results of the quantitative analysis are significant for two
key reasons. First, they indicate that the Building Skills Policy
contributed to a lowering of competition for public construction
contracts in the 48-month period surrounding its implementa-
tion. As indicated by the theoretical models reviewed in Section 2,
such an impact has efficiency consequences for the public
construction programme, potentially contributing to higher costs
and/or lower quality outcomes. Given that WA is currently under
the influence of a range of economic pressures, these added costs
are of particular concern.
However, this conclusion does not necessarily imply that the
Priority Access Policy was a superior training policy. It is
important to ask why the Priority Access Policy did not affect
the willingness of construction companies to bid for public
projects. One possible answer is that it did not impose high
training requirements—or affect the training actions of construc-
tion firms in a significant manner. If this is the case, the evidence
presented in this paper cannot be interpreted as supportive of the
policy.
In sum, the results from the quantitative analysis indicate that
the Building Skills Policy affected the actions of construction
companies, causing some small to medium-sized construction
companies to avoid tendering for public construction contracts.
These results also suggest, however, that the policy was effective
in influencing the inclusion/exclusion of public contractors
according to their training commitments. There is little evidence
that the Priority Access Policy affected bid activity in the
public construction ‘market’. Although this may be interpreted
in the positive light—that is, of the policy not having negative
competitive effects—it is also possible that the policy did
not affect training outcomes on public works. The qualitative
results, presented in Section 4, cast further light on these
outcomes.
4. Qualitative analysis
The qualitative analysis of the training policies of the Western
Australian government, presented in this section is based on the
costs and benefits as perceived by the main entities affected by
these policies. These entities include the contracting agencies,
such as the Department of Housing and Works; sponsoring
agencies, such as WA’s Department of Education and Training;
head building contractors; and subcontractors. The section
adds important details on the costs and benefits of training
policies leveraged on public construction contracts and, as such,
it complements the quantitative materials outlined in Section 3.
The sample for the qualitative stage included the key policy
officers of the contracting and sponsoring agencies. It also
included groups of head and subcontractors. The first group
of contractors comprised companies that are currently engaged
on public works projects. The second group comprised companies
that have ceased tendering for public construction contracts.
In the Perth region, one small, medium, and large head contractor
was interviewed from each group. In the non-Perth region,
small, medium and large head contractors currently engaged in
public construction projects were interviewed. The subcontractors
interviewed were drawn from both the Perth region and regions
other than the Perth region, and also ranged in size from small
to large. The interviews were based on a semi-structured
format, with a standard set of questions being asked of each
entity, but allowing for other relevant issues to be discussed.
All the interviews were conducted face-to-face and digitally
recorded to ensure the accuracy of the interview transcriptions
and summaries. The following paragraphs outline the general
nature of the responses to questions relating to the costs and
benefits of the different policies that were coded by the project
team.
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Table 3
Estimated coefficients for equation including market segment measures. Bid
numbers on government non-residential construction contracts (Building Skills
Policy), Western Australia 2000–2004.
Variable Coefficient Prob.
Constant 9.636244 0.0000
Policy implementation date (PD) 0.426558 0.0810
Contract above trigger value (Z) 1.964689 0.2361
Pre-qual.3 1.141072 0.0955
Pre-qual.4 0.045097 0.9818
Pre-qual.5 0.677310 0.6921
Region 1.290959 0.0000
Building cost index 0.045998 0.0002
PDZpre-qual.3 3.350192 0.0447
PDpre-qual.4 0.930167 0.4235
PDpre-qual.5 0.378037 0.5759
Notes: Log-likelihood: 1871.4; nobs: 807; method: OLS.
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4.1. Western Australia’s priority access policy
Supporting the conclusions reached in the quantitative study,
the transcript evidence relating to the Priority Access Policy
indicates that it involved only negligible costs but also few
benefits. The sponsoring agency, the Department of Education and
Training identified only minor costs associated with processing
the Priority Access application forms and monitoring the Policy:
‘‘It was pretty light. Once people got their certificate and were
deemed as Priority Access compliant that was it, there was no
heavy monitoring. We had one person on it, working on
Priority Access, so there weren’t a lot of resources put in it from
our end.’’ (Key policy officer, DET, WA).
Similarly, the contracting agency, the Department of Housing
and Works, incurred few additional administrative costs—
primarily associated with including the provisions of the Policy
in the Department’s tender and contract documentation
‘‘It’s not hard to write things into contracts, it’s very easy to
write obligations into contracts.’’ (Key policy officer, DHW, WA).
However, the DHW did raise concerns about the impacts of the
Priority Access Policy on tender prices, expressing a belief that the
Policy had created a disincentive for contractors to bid on
government contracts. The contractors that were interviewed
during the study did not offer any support for this proposition:
claiming that the Policy had no effect on their willingness to bid
for government contracts or on the level of their bids (more
information on this is contained in coming paragraphs).
The head and subcontractors interviewed associated the
Priority Access Policy only with minor time costs. These costs
were linked to the tasks of completing and submitting necessary
paperwork. The Policy was not associated with any additional
training costs. The contractors interviewed perceived that they
were already compliant with the Policy and that the Policy was
not the source of their firm’s training decision.
This last observation also has relevance to the benefits of the
Priority Access Policy. Keeping in mind that the Policy’s objective
was to:
‘‘Increase the number of apprenticeship and traineeship
opportunities for job seekers.’’ (Priority Access n.d., p.3).
The last comment by the contractors suggests it was not
successful. Indeed this was also the assessment of the government
agencies associated with its implementation. Key problems
apparently related to the low training requirements of the Policy.
A DET policy officer commented:
‘‘It [the Policy’s training criteria] became so flexible over the
years so that people just needed to show that they were
committed to training, they provided work experience, and
they employed uni-graduates, that sort of thing. It got a piece
of cake to meet. At the end of the day I didn’t believe it added
any value to the system other than one of perception.’’
A similar assessment was made by a DHW policy officer, who
also highlighted some counter-productive elements of the Policy:
‘‘When they brought in Priority Access the Priority Access that
we ended up with had no particular focus on training either
apprentices or professionals or graduates, so providing a
contractor could demonstrate training obligationsythey be-
came registeredyThere were comments made across the
industry that ‘well now we’ve sacked all of our apprentices
because we don’t need them.’’
The contractors who participated in the study were also fully
aware of the lax monitoring of compliance with the Policy—and
apparently felt no pressure to alter their training decisions as a
result of the Policy.
Thus, consistent with the quantitative results, this part of the
study concluded that the Priority Access Policy imposed few
additional costs on the construction industry, but, and possibly
more importantly, it also resulted in few (if any) benefits. There
were a number of problems with the Policy, which should be
avoided in other attempts to achieve training outcomes from
public construction contracts. These included, most notably,
poorly specified policy objectives and a lack of resourcing of
policy compliance. The ability of firms to nominate a range of
expenditures on staff development clearly confused the policy
intent and undermined efforts to monitor and enforce the Policy.
The Policy is likely to have been more effective if it had nominated
a small range of training activities (for example, apprentices,
trainees and cadets). This would need to be complemented with
an adequate resourcing of efforts to monitor compliance and a
willingness to reject non-conforming bids.
4.2. Western Australia’s building skills policy
The transcript evidence on the Building Skills Policy also
creates a negative impression of the net benefits of the policy
intervention. Additional administrative costs were generated by
the Policy; however, few tangible benefits can be identified.
The sponsoring agency, the Department of Education and Training
identified additional costs that were associated with the development
and evaluation of what was, apparently, a ‘complex policy’. The DHW
incurred some minor additional costs due to the need to incorporate
the Policy’s provisions into standard construction contracts. However,
as before, its primary concern was with the negative impacts of the
Policy on contractors’ willingness to bid on government contracts.
The contractors interviewed typically did not associate the
Policy with more than ‘nuisance level’ costs. Importantly, in the
main, they did not link the Policy to their decisions about bidding
on government projects. Only one of the participants in the study
claimed he had been dissuaded from competing for government
jobs because of the training provisions.
The industry participants also typically did not link their
training decisions to the requirements of the Building Skills Policy.
As was the case for the Priority Access Policy, these comments also
have importance for assessments of the benefits of the Policy—
especially as its stated objective was to:
‘‘ensure an adequate supply of skilled labour for current and
future needs’’ (Building Skills n.d.:3).
One contractor commented that the Building Skills Policy:
‘‘ywouldn’t encourage me to employ apprentices. We employ
apprentices because we employ apprentices. I’m not going to
employ an apprentice just because I want to get a government
job.’’
The policy officers interviewed were also sceptical about the
positive effects of the Building Skills Policy. A telling comment
was made by a policy officer from the DET, based on his
department’s own previous evaluation of the Policy:
‘‘The evaluation of the Building Skills Policy was not very
positive, it was found not to have added any new apprentices,
we could only find one, we could only identify one.’’
The critical reasons for this Policy’s lack of success also appear
to relate to measurement and monitoring problems. First, once
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again, contractors appear to have found the Policy’s provisions
easy to avoid (limiting compliance incentives). One contractor
provided the following example:
‘‘You get a hospital say, and you’ve got a component for the
mechanical contractor, whose got to provide so many training
hours, and he’s got a DHW contract with us, and he’s got 15
others with a resource company, and he’s got two apprentices,
he shoots those two apprentices over here, and meets all his
requirements. He hasn’t actually gone forward. You know, so
that’s where the whole system flounders.’’
The sponsoring agency also apparently encountered difficulties
in measuring actual training outcomes:
‘‘The Policy required that we could only count people working
on the site, we could only count people or trades that were
actually working on the sites, so you had your cabinetmakers
and refrigeration people that didn’t count, even though they
were doing work for that building.’’
In summary, the information collected in the interviews with
participants in the industry indicates that there were few benefits
generated by the Building Skills Policy. The Policy was not
perceived by the interviewees as a significant influence on their
training decisions. Other factors—such as confidence in future
projects—were much stronger influences on these decisions.
However, the Policy was associated with administrative costs for
both the government agencies and, to a lesser extent, the
contractors. There is some evidence in the interview transcripts
that these deterred some contractors from bidding for govern-
ment contracts. To the extent that this evidence is representative
of the response of a number of contractors across the State, the
Policy can be seen to have reduced the pool of competitors for
government contracts. This constitutes another important cost of
the Policy. The contractors who remained interested in tendering
for government contracts appear likely to be those who were
already committed to training and/or were able to spread the
administrative and training costs across a range of projects. Those
who dropped out were either less committed to training or less
able to meet the administrative and/or training costs. The
incidence of training on government projects may have increased
due to these ‘selection effects’ of the Building Skills Policy. There is
no evidence in our transcript evidence that the Policy altered the
level of training investment in the State.
5. Conclusions
The evidence compiled on the leveraging of training outcomes
on public construction projects in this paper raises substantial
concerns about the net social benefits of the current training
policy interventions of the WA government. The interventions
appear to involve a ‘light’ approach to the imposition of training
obligations on contractors. As such, they have the advantage of
keeping administrative and additional contracting costs to a
minimum. However, the positive impacts of the policy interventions
on training outcomes also appear to have been very small, at least in
the short- to medium term.
Generally, this paper has highlighted that in the absence of
strong industry commitment to policy objectives, policy inter-
ventions are likely to result in high levels of avoidance activity and
generate very few benefits. Thus, for policy action on, for example,
training to be successful, compliance issues must be adequately
addressed.
Currently it appears that pre-qualification schemes (similar to
the Priority Access Scheme) and schemes that rely on measuring
the training investments of contractors within particular projects
do not achieve high levels of compliance and involve significant
costs for the administering authority. Alternatives need to be
developed to these policies and a recommendation is thus made
that policy alternatives be fully researched and evaluated. The
rising trend towards the contracting out of public-sector construc-
tion work, together with concerns about the availability of skilled
labour makes this type of research of great policy relevance.
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